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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
Evaluating  Accountable  Care  Organizations  is difﬁcult  because  there  is a great  deal  of  heterogeneity  in
terms  of their  reimbursement  incentives  and  other  programmatic  features.  We examine  how  variation
in  reimbursement  incentives  and  administration  among  two Medicaid  managed  care  plans  impacts  uti-
lization  and spending.  We  use a quasi-experimental  approach  exploiting  the  timing and  county-speciﬁc
implementation  of  Medicaid  managed  care  mandates  in  two contiguous  regions  of Kentucky.  We  ﬁnd
large  differences  in the  relative  success  of each  plan  in reducing  utilization  and spending  that  are  likely
driven  by  important  differences  in  plan  design.  The  plan  that  capitated  primary  care  physicians  and  con-
tracted  out  many  administrative  responsibilities  to an  experienced  managed  care  organization  achieved
signiﬁcant  reductions  in  outpatient  and  professional  utilization.  The  plan  that  opted  for a fee-for-service
reimbursement  scheme  with  a group  withhold  and  handled  administration  internally  saw  a  much more
modest  reduction  in  outpatient  utilization  and  an  increase  in  professional  utilization.
©  2014  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  B.V.  This  is  an  open  access  article  under  the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
1. Introduction
Although the implementation of the key features of the Afford-
able Care Act (ACA) is well underway, policymakers continue to
struggle with the best health care ﬁnance and delivery system to
achieve the “Triple Aim” of improved quality of care, improved
population health, and reduced cost (Berwick et al., 2008). This
is especially true among state Medicaid programs, as many states
have recently expanded their Medicaid programs in January 2014,
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despite concerns about the impact of the expansion on state
budgets.3
One relatively new approach to this problem is to create what
are known as Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs), which can
be generally deﬁned as coordinated networks of medical providers
that assume the risk for the quality and total cost of care for their
patients (Burns and Pauley, 2012). As discussed in Fisher et al.
(2012), much like more traditional managed care organizations
(MCOs), health maintenance organizations (HMOs), or integrated
delivery networks, ACOs may  differ both in terms of speciﬁc con-
tract characteristics and the populations they serve, with current
ACOs providing care through contracts for Medicaid, Medicare, pri-
vate payers, and different combinations of these groups.
One challenge associated with evaluating the success of
ACOs, MCOs, or integrated delivery networks, is the fact that
there may  be a great deal of heterogeneity across these
networks/organizations/plans in terms of their reimbursement
incentives and other key programmatic features (Gaynor et al.,
3 For a summary of state Medicaid expansion plans, see: http://kff.org/medicaid/
state-indicator/state-activity-around-expanding-medicaid-under-the-affordable-
care-act/.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2014.03.001
0167-6296/© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
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2004). For example, some plans may  reimburse primary care
providers via capitation while others may  reimburse via fee-for-
service (FFS). Research attempting to make blanket statements
about the impact of ACOs or MCOs in improving quality and reduc-
ing costs seem to sweep this heterogeneity under the rug. This
challenge, along with the concern about the non-random selection
of participants, suggests that there is little convincing evidence on
the impact of such plans on the utilization of health care services,
health care costs, and health outcomes.
The purpose of our paper is to directly examine how reim-
bursement incentives and other key programmatic features among
Medicaid accountable/managed care plans impact health care uti-
lization and spending using a quasi-experimental approach that
exploits the timing and county-speciﬁc implementation of Med-
icaid managed care mandates in Kentucky in the late 1990s.4 The
Medicaid program in Kentucky was changed from a FFS system
to a managed care plan in two geographically distinct sub-sets of
counties. We  can compare recipients initially in each of the two sets
of “treatment” counties before and after this reform with recipi-
ents initially in neighboring “control” counties that remained in a
FFS system, in order to deal with any concerns about non-random
selection into the plans.
Despite serving Medicaid recipients in the same state, and oper-
ating less than 100 miles apart, the two plans selected very different
reimbursement mechanisms for physicians and diverged along
other plan dimensions as well. These differences motivate our
heterogeneous treatment effect approach of modeling the impact
of each plan separately. The Louisville-centered plan (Passport)
elected to reimburse physicians using a capitated payment scheme,
while the Lexington-centered plan (Kentucky Health Select or KHS)
opted for a modiﬁed FFS reimbursement scheme for physicians fea-
turing a group withhold. Another important difference is that the
Louisville-centered “capitated” plan contracted out administrative
responsibilities, such as utilization review, to an experienced MCO
while the Lexington-centered “withhold” plan decided to handle
such responsibilities internally. These fundamental organizational
differences between the two plans could have an impact upon their
ability to improve quality, while at the same time reducing utiliza-
tion and spending.
We  ﬁnd that both organizations/plans decreased the probabil-
ity of any monthly outpatient utilization among the children in
our sample, though the Louisville-centered “capitated” plan was
able to do so to a greater degree (a 61 percent reduction versus
a 17 percent reduction). In addition, both plans appear to have
had a minimal impact on the probability of any monthly inpatient
utilization for children, which may  be explained by low baseline
inpatient utilization rates. Our most striking ﬁnding is that the
Louisville-centered “capitated” plan reduced the monthly prob-
ability of any professional (physician) utilization by 44 percent
among children, while in the Lexington-centered “withhold” plan
professional (physician) utilization actually increased by 6 percent.
If we instead measure utilization along the intensive margin (using
the number of monthly visits or monthly expenditures), we  still
ﬁnd that the Louisville-centered “capitated” plan led to signiﬁcant
reductions in professional and outpatient utilization not matched
by the Lexington-centered “withhold” plan.
Both plans increased the probability of having any monthly well
child visits, though the Louisville-centered “capitated” plan did so
to a greater degree. Therefore, the heterogeneous treatments gen-
erated by differences in plan design between the two regions led
to different outcomes with respect to utilization. Finally, we ﬁnd
4 According to the Kaiser Family Foundation (2012), over sixty ﬁve percent of all
Medicaid beneﬁciaries were enrolled in some form of a managed care plan by 2010.
suggestive evidence that the reductions in utilization observed in
the Louisville-centered “capitated” plan did not lead to adverse
health outcomes for asthmatic children, as measured by inpatient
hospitalizations. These results are robust to a variety of speciﬁca-
tion checks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 pro-
vides a description of the policy change in Kentucky Medicaid.
Section 3 reviews the relevant literature on physician reimburse-
ment and Medicaid managed care and describes how our approach
contributes to this literature. Our methodological approach and
identiﬁcation strategy is described in Section 4 and our data in Sec-
tion 5. Sections 6 and 7 present our results and speciﬁcation checks.
Section 8 concludes with a discussion of policy implications.
2. The introduction of managed care in Kentucky Medicaid
2.1. Brief history
In October 1995, the Commonwealth of Kentucky received Cen-
ters for Medicare and Medicaid (CMS) approval to initiate a major
restructuring of the Kentucky Medicaid program by dividing the
state into eight regional managed care networks. Within each
region public and private providers were expected to collaborate
to form managed care partnerships to oversee the provision of
Medicaid services, rather than contracting these services out to
commercial managed care providers. The goals of this restructuring
were to improve access and quality of care, stabilize cost growth,
and emphasize primary care and prevention.
In November 1997, Medicaid managed care enrollment began
in the two  regions that contain the state’s two  major urban
areas, region 3 (anchored by Louisville) and region 5 (anchored
by Lexington).5 These, along with the other regions, are labeled
in Fig. 1. The managed care organization/plan covering region 3
was named the Passport Health Plan (Passport) and the managed
care organization/plan covering region 5 was named the Kentucky
Health Select Plan (KHS). Ultimately, the other six regions were not
able to successfully create managed care partnerships. Passport,
designed around the University of Louisville network, was  charged
with providing Medicaid managed care coverage to all Medicaid
recipients in Jefferson County (containing Louisville) and 15 sur-
rounding counties. Similarly, the KHS plan was designed around
the University of Kentucky network and was  charged with provid-
ing Medicaid managed care to all Medicaid recipients in Fayette
County (containing Lexington) and 20 surrounding counties.6
Both organizations also agreed to continue reporting encounter
data to the state as they had under Medicaid FFS reimbursement
rules. Because the organizations were made up of local providers
that were already accustomed to reporting claims to the state
for billing purposes, this did not represent a change in reporting
practice.7 The region 5 partnership dissolved within two and a half
years of its introduction. Today Medicaid recipients in region 3 are
5 Currie and Fahr (2005) cite reports from the Health Care Financing Administra-
tion that classify the Medicaid managed care penetration rate in Kentucky as over 50
percent in 1992, 1993, and 1994. This is likely due to Kentucky Medicaid’s primary
care  case management program (KENPAC) where recipients are assigned a speciﬁc
primary care provider. Although a primary care “gatekeeper” physician is one part
of  most managed care programs, we do not consider this feature alone to be enough
to  characterize a plan as being managed care.
6 There are some Medicaid recipients in these counties that are excluded from
managed care. They include those in nursing facilities or psychiatric facilities for an
extended stay, those served under home and community-based waivers, and those
who must spend down to meet eligibility income criteria.
7 This model of having a single community-organized health system (COHS) man-
age care in a given region without accepting commercial bids was one of several
models used in California to implement Medicaid managed care.
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Fig. 1. Kentucky’s 8 Regions, including passport counties (Region 3) and Kentucky Health Select (Region 5).
still covered under the Passport managed care plan, while Medic-
aid recipients in the rest of the state (including recipients in region
5) were covered under Fee-For-Service (FFS) Medicaid until late
2011.8
Table 1 provides trends in overall and managed care eligibility
over time. The table suggests that these two regions account for
almost half of the state’s total population and roughly 35 percent of
the state’s Medicaid population. Table 1 also suggests that Medicaid
is an important potential source of insurance coverage in Kentucky.
2.2. State capitation payments to Passport and KHS
Both Passport and KHS were given the responsibility of pro-
viding comprehensive health care coverage for their Medicaid
enrollees in exchange for capitation payments (ﬂat monthly fees
per recipient based on their category of eligibility) negotiated with
the state. The monthly capitation rates for most of the timeframe
we analyze in this paper are presented in Table 2A. Appendix
Table A1 presents a list of the services covered under these cap-
itation payments and those excluded for both plans. The excluded
services were to be covered by the state directly through FFS reim-
bursement or capitated through a separate waiver.
8 The discussion of the history and institutional structure of the Passport and KHS
health plans presented here draws in large part from Bartosch and Haber (2004),
a  report completed by RTI International for the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid
Services. To learn more about the most recent reforms to the Kentucky Medicaid
program see: http://medicaidmc.ky.gov/Pages/index.aspx.
2.3. Plan reimbursement for providers
Passport elected to reimburse primary care providers (PCPs) on
a capitated basis, with the capitation rate adjusted for the age, gen-
der, and eligibility mix  of their patients.9 In addition, PCPs were
eligible for performance-based bonuses based on such activities as
extending ofﬁce hours, maintaining an appointment reminder sys-
tem, accepting new patients, and meeting goals for utilization of
emergency room visits, inpatient days, and specialty referral costs.
In order for Passport to better measure resource use, an encounter
claims bonus of roughly $1 for every non-FFS claim submitted was
also established for PCPs. Hospital reimbursement was set up on a
per diem basis using the Medicaid fee schedule with a 10 percent
withhold.10
KHS instead elected to reimburse physicians and hospitals on a
FFS basis using the Medicaid fee schedule with a 20 percent with-
hold. This means that physicians would receive 80 percent of the
fee associated with each service performed and the remaining 20
percent was  held back until the end of the year to be used as a
potential reward for meeting budget targets. PCPs were organized
into “pools of doctors” or PODs with each POD assigned a budget
by KHS. If actual health care expenditures attributed to the POD
9 When we  say that Passport capitates primary care providers, we mean Passport
makes capitated payments to primary care practices. These could include different
numbers of individual primary care providers whose individual compensation from
the  practice is not observed.
10 The current Medicaid fee schedule for Kentucky is available at the following
URL: http://chfs.ky.gov/dms/fee.htm.
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Table 1
Trends in Kentucky Population and Medicaid Enrollment (in thousands).
Year Statewide
population
Region 3
(Passport)
population
Region 5
(KHS)
population
Statewide
Medicaid
enrollment
Region 3
(Passport)
Medicaid
enrollment
Region 5
(KHS)
Medicaid
enrollment
Statewide
Medicaid
managed
care
Statewide
Medicaid
FFS
1997 3953 1093 719 532 112 75 0 532
1998  3985 1102 730 521 109 73 181 340
1999  4018 1114 742 518 106 71 177 341
2000  4049 1125 810 557 114 79 114 443
2001  4066 1132 801 608 126 88 126 482
2002  4087 1139 790 627 131 91 131 496
Sources: Population estimates are from the Kentucky State Data Center (http://ksdc.louisville.edu/) and the Medicaid eligible estimates are from the Kentucky Cabinet for
Health  and Family Services (http://chfs.ky.gov/dms/stats.htm). Passport was  implemented in Region 3 from 1998 onward. Kentucky Health Select (KHS) was implemented
in  Region 5 during 1998–1999.
Table 2A
Passport and Kentucky Health Select monthly capitation rates (in dollars).
Eligibility category Passport
Prior to November 1997 November 1997 to June 1998 July 1998 to December 1998
AFDC/TANF N/A 137.00 146.20
Foster Care N/A 177.38 188.52
SOBRA N/A 171.02 181.85
SSI  with Medicare N/A 117.00 125.24
SSI  without Medicare N/A 504.65 531.51
SCHIP  N/A N/A N/A
Eligibility category Kentucky Health Select
Prior to November 1997 November 1997 to June 1998 July 1998 to December 1998
AFDC/TANF N/A 124.18 150.39
Foster Care N/A 166.26 194.52
SOBRA N/A 160.28 188.67
SSI  with Medicare N/A 143.03 170.16
SSI  without Medicare N/A 382.39 421.14
SCHIP  N/A N/A N/A
Source: Adopted from Bartosch and Haber (2004).
Notes: AFDC/TANF refers to Medicaid recipients whose eligibility is tied to their eligibility for cash welfare, called Aid to Families with Dependent Children prior to the 1997
welfare  reform and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families afterwards. SOBRA refers to Medicaid recipients eligible as a result of the Sixth Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act,  which expanded Medicaid eligibility for children and pregnant women. SSI refers to Medicaid recipients also eligible for Supplemental Security Income Program and
SCHIP  refers to the State Children’s Health Insurance Program.
exceeded the budget, then the proportion of the 20 percent with-
hold returned to the POD at the end of the year would be reduced.
If the POD came in under budget, then the entire withhold would
be returned as well as the surplus.
2.4. Summary of the key differences between the plans
As summarized in Table 2B, a key difference between the two
organizations was the way in which physicians were reimbursed.
Passport used capitation, while KHS opted for FFS with a 20 percent
withhold. Under the Passport plan, the marginal revenue generated
for a PCP from an additional ofﬁce visit is essentially zero. On the
other hand, PCPs still received additional revenue from additional
visits under the KHS plan. Although the withhold may  have encour-
aged some utilization reduction, it is important to note that this
bonus was not measured at the level of the individual provider.
Therefore, each individual physician may  have had an incentive
to “free ride” off of the utilization reductions generated by other
members of their POD, while keeping their own schedule full.
Another key difference between the two organizations was
the way in which they performed basic administrative functions,
such as claims processing, member/provider services, case man-
agement, and information sharing. Passport opted to outsource
these responsibilities to an administrative service organization
(ASO), AmeriHealth Mercy Health Plan, based in Philadelphia. KHS
decided to handle these responsibilities internally, despite a lack of
experience at managing a managed care network. To the extent that
MCOs/ACOs reduce utilization/spending through increased coor-
dination of care and careful review of physician practice patterns,
experience in these basic administrative functions may  be crucial.
Passport’s choice to outsource these functions to an experienced
ASO may  have contributed to its relative success at reducing uti-
lization among its enrollees.
These initial choices described above made by the Passport
organization (capitating reimbursement for PCPs and outsourcing
important administrative functions to an experienced ASO) cre-
ated a plan that was in many ways much closer to a “textbook”
HMO/MCO/ACO than the KHS plan. Thus, we would anticipate Pass-
port to be more successful at reducing utilization than KHS.
3. Literature review
Through our description of Kentucky’s Medicaid reform out-
lined in previous section, we view our study as contributing to two
distinct strands of literature in health economics.11 First, although
11 Note that there is a lengthy literature that examines the effects of private man-
aged  care plans as well as Medicaid managed care. See, for example, Luft (1981),
Miller and Luft (1994, 1997), Glied (2000), Cutler and Zeckhauser (2000), and
Cutler et al. (2000) for discussions of managed care, and Sparer (2012) for a recent
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Table  2B
Summary of plan differences.
Passport KHS
Timeframe November 1997–present November 1997–June 2000
#  Counties/Anchor 16 counties/Louisville 21 counties/Lexington
PCP  reimbursement Capitation FFS based on Medicaid fee schedule with 20% withhold
Hospital reimbursement FFS based on Medicaid fee schedule with a 10% withhold FFS based on Medicaid fee schedule with 20% withhold
Specialist reimbursement FFS based on Medicaid fee schedule with a 10% withhold FFS based on Medicaid fee schedule with a 10% withhold
Administrative Responsibilities Contracted out to AmeriHealth Mercy Health Plan Handled internally
Report claims/encounters as in the
pre-reform period?
Yes Yes
Source: Adopted from Bartosch and Haber (2004).
many academic studies on different forms of managed care (such
as ACOs, MCOs, HMOs, PCCMs and IPOs) have emphasized the
incentives of capitation payments, the reimbursement to physi-
cians within the organization can vary, even though the organization
as a whole is paid on a capitated basis.12 In particular, the KHS com-
bination of FFS physician reimbursement and a group “withhold”
for meeting budget targets has rarely been examined, and only in
the context of a private managed care plan. Second, there is a some-
what larger “case study” literature that has examined the effects of
a given state’s changes in its Medicaid program on utilization, cost,
and health outcomes.
With respect to physician reimbursement within an organiza-
tion, Cooper and Rebitzer (2002) note that “most of the empirical
literature on physician incentives and managed care organizations
treats physician incentive systems as a black box whose internal
operation is obscured from view.” (p. 12). One exception is Gaynor
et al. (2004), who study how PCPs in managed care networks
respond to incentives to contain medical expenditures.13 The HMO
in that study divided physicians into panels of doctors (or PODS).14
Part of the reimbursement for the group was withheld, and then the
entire group was given ﬁnancial rewards if they collectively con-
tained costs. GRT found that there was signiﬁcant free-riding when
the size of the POD became too large. For example, PODs with three
physicians were much more effective at coming in under the cap
than PODs with six or more physicians. Our study sheds further
light on the ineffectiveness of extremely large PODs, since the Lex-
ington region had a similar withholding policy for physicians, and
the POD size averaged 20 primary care physicians.15
Although there is a large literature on Medicaid managed care
(see the recent summary contained in Duggan and Hayford, 2013),
the most convincing studies in this area have either focused on the
“case study” of California, which created a quasi-experiment set up
by phasing in Medicaid managed care in different counties, or at the
national level through different state-by-state implementations.16
The published studies that take advantage of California’s county-
level Medicaid managed care mandates are most similar to our
approach. Duggan (2004) examines the impact of managed care
summary on Medicaid managed care studies. For a discussion of Medicare managed
care, see Kaiser Family Foundation (2007) Fact Sheet “Medicare Advantage” and for
more discussion of Medicaid managed care, see Kaiser Family Foundation (2012)
Policy Brief “Medicaid and Managed Care: Key Data, Trends, and Issues”.
12 See, for example, Burns and Pauley (2012) for recent discussion of ACOs.
13 See Chalkley and Tilley (2006) and Dusheiko et al. (2006) for examples from the
UK.
14 There is also a theoretical literature that explores the consequences of organiza-
tional fragmentation in the health care system, which emphasizes that physicians
are central to resource allocation and care processes within a hospital, but are largely
independent of hospital management. See Cebul et al. (2008).
15 Bartosch and Haber (2004, p. 23).
16 Examples at the national level include Duggan and Hayford (2013), Herring and
Adams (2011), Currie and Fahr (2005), and Kaestner et al. (2005).
on Medicaid spending and birth outcomes. Aizer et al. (2007)
also examine the impact of managed care on birth outcomes.17
These studies emphasize the impact of the capitated payment
that the state government offers to the managed care organiza-
tion per patient, but do not discuss in detail the reimbursement
of physicians.18 To date, no study has systematically examined
how physician reimbursement within managed care organiza-
tions has affected utilization in Medicaid. Unlike California, where
there were a multitude of organizations who may have different
reimbursement arrangements with their physicians, in Kentucky,
Passport and KHS each had clear, and uniquely different reimburse-
ment regimes for physicians.
There are several other differences between the Kentucky
reform and the California reform that we exploit to our advan-
tage. First, unlike in Kentucky, the California Medicaid managed
care data used in the literature has no information on utilization
for Medicaid managed care recipients. Duggan (2004) focuses on
Medicaid capitation payments rather than utilization in his indi-
vidual level analysis and looks at birth outcomes at the county level
using hospital discharge data rather than Medicaid claims data.
Aizer et al. (2007) focus on birth outcomes, rather than overall uti-
lization, using the California Birth Statistical Master File and Birth
Cohort ﬁles. A second issue with the California Medicaid data is that
the mandates for managed care were not binding for much larger
groups of recipients and services than in Kentucky. For example,
in some California counties undocumented workers, SSI recipients,
and foster children were not required to participate in Medicaid
managed care. In Kentucky, Medicaid managed care is mandatory
for SSI recipients and foster children if they live in any of the man-
aged care counties. Both California papers attempt to deal with this
issue in their analysis of birth outcomes by focusing on those in
their data for whom the managed care mandate is most likely to be
binding.
Song et al. (2012) also provide more recent “case study” evi-
dence from Massachusetts by examining provider organizations
that entered into an alternative contracting arrangement with Blue
Cross Blue Shield in 2009–2010. This contracting arrangement con-
sists of a global budget with pay-for-performance and places the
participating provider organizations at risk for excessive spend-
ing. They found that rates of spending increases slowed in these
provider organizations as compared to control practices, with a
17 Barham et al. (2013) also examine birth and pregnancy outcomes in California
and ﬁnd that outcomes improve for the moderately disadvantaged but not the
extremely disadvantaged.
18 Duggan (2004) notes that in California “fee-for-service reimbursement rates
for  many providers, including physicians and pharmacies, were set at the state, and
not  at the provider level” (p. 2563). The only discussion of physician reimbursement
within a managed care organization is anecdotal; Duggan notes that in one managed
care organization – Cal Optima in Orange County – the physicians received “140%
of  the Medicaid fee schedule.” (p. 2566).
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bigger difference in the second year after implementation than the
ﬁrst.
4. Methods and identiﬁcation strategy
4.1. Identifying the impact of medicaid managed care
It is well recognized by health economists that selection
bias represents a key barrier to assessing the impact of man-
aged/accountable care on utilization. In many settings, especially
in the private market, consumers have the choice between some
form of a managed care plan and a FFS plan. Since the managed
care plan represents the cheaper, but less generous option, it will
tend to be more attractive to healthier individuals.19 We  refer to
this as “enrollee selection.” Thus the lower costs per managed
care enrollee may  reﬂect more stringent ﬁnancial incentives on
providers and alternative delivery methods, a healthier pool of
participants (enrollee selection), or both. To identify the “pure”
managed care effect one needs to keep the health composition
within each type of plan constant, and, in general, OLS estimates
will fail to do so and thus overstate the pure managed care effect.
In the context of public health insurance, especially Medicaid,
the selection issues are perhaps somewhat different. The Medicaid
population is poor and typically faces no copayments, premiums,
or deductibles. In some contexts – such as the California Medicaid
managed care setting that Duggan (2004) and Aizer et al. (2007)
studied – recipients were initially able to voluntarily choose Med-
icaid managed care or stay in FFS, and then some California counties
later mandated managed care enrollment. At least in the voluntary
setting, it is not clear that the ﬁnancial incentives to be in a man-
aged care plan are very strong because Medicaid FFS plans tend to
have little patient cost-sharing. Thus, it is not clear whether the
selection bias will be the same as in the private setting.
In the Kentucky context, the switch from FFS to managed care
was mandatory for a large portion of the Medicaid population,
occurred at essentially one point in time, and was implemented
in some, but not all Kentucky counties. In other words, a Medic-
aid recipient could not simply choose to opt into a managed care
program, instead enrollment was based purely on county of resi-
dence. Therefore, enrollees in certain counties were automatically
enrolled in managed care, while those in neighboring counties out-
side the managed care boundaries were not. This description of
managed care implementation in Kentucky suggests a “difference-
in-differences” approach to identify the impact of managed care
on health care utilization that is free from the “enrollee selection”
problem that plagues much of the literature.
One option for implementing this difference-in-differences
approach would be to collect monthly enrollment and utilization
data on all Medicaid enrollees in all 120 Kentucky counties before
and after the reform. We  could run a regression with an indicator of
any monthly utilization as the dependent variable and an indicator
of managed care enrollment, which would equal zero for all recip-
ients in the pre-period and equal one for those living in one of the
37 managed care counties in the post period, as the independent
variable. Thus we would be comparing the monthly utilization of
those living in the 37 managed care counties before and after the
reform with those living in any of the other 83 counties (see Fig. 1).
While such an approach would shed light on the impact of
managed care, it suffers from several problems. First, it would
treat managed care counties containing Kentucky’s largest cities
19 Cutler and Reber (1998) show that younger and healthier individuals at Har-
vard switched to less generous health plans after cost-sharing arrangements were
changed, leading to an “adverse selection death spiral.”
(Louisville in Jefferson county and Lexington in Fayette county) the
same as much more rural managed care counties. In addition, these
cities served as the “hub” for managed care activities within their
respective regions, so they are also different from more rural areas
in that regard. It may  be the case that because Jefferson county
contains Louisville, it is too different from other Kentucky counties
for any comparison to be feasible. Second, it may  not be reason-
able to use counties in the far eastern or western parts of the state
as controls for managed care counties in central Kentucky. Table 3
provides a descriptive comparison of each of the eight proposed
managed care regions using “QuickFacts” data from the U.S. Cen-
sus and conﬁrms that there are important differences between the
regions.20 Third, there are also important differences in utilization
patterns in adults versus children, so an analysis of all enrollees
would ignore these differences. Finally, it does not address the
potential endogeneity of residence. Enrollees may  move across
county lines in order to opt in or opt out of managed care. We
refer to this as “migration endogeneity”, an issue recognized in the
California Medicaid context by Aizer et al. (2007).
Given these concerns, an alternative approach would be to focus
our attention on enrollees in the outermost counties in both man-
aged care regions that share a border with a FFS county. These
outermost managed care counties and their FFS neighbors are likely
to make for much more homogenous treatment and control groups
than would be the case if we  used all 120 counties. These outermost
managed care counties are also more likely to have been “follow-
ers” rather than “leaders” in terms of setting managed care policy
for their regions. This “border county” approach is motivated by,
among others, the Black (1999) analysis of the effects of school test
scores on housing prices. By looking at geographic areas that are
contiguous and relatively homogeneous – yet are treated very dif-
ferently by the implementation of managed care – we  feel more
conﬁdent that any measured impacts do not represent other omit-
ted county-level factors.
In order to address migration endogeneity, we use managed
care eligibility based on county of residence in January 1997 as
a proxy for actual managed care enrollment. Presumably, choice of
residence in January 1997 is exogenous to the implementation of
the Medicaid managed care that occurred in November 1997. We
also follow the literature and focus on our attention on children,
speciﬁcally children enrolled continuously from January 1997 to
June 1999.21 As a speciﬁcation check, we  replicate our analysis on
20 Table 3 suggests that the Passport region (region 3) has a lower percentage of
white inhabitants than any other region and is among the highest in terms of high
school graduation rates. The KHS region (region 5) has the second lowest percentage
of  white inhabitants and the lowest homeownership rate. The poverty rate in both
managed care regions is much lower than in regions 4, 7, and 8.
21 Some studies analyze individuals with Medicaid spells as short as one month,
yet there are a number of challenges with using short Medicaid spells to measure the
impact of managed care. First, Medicaid eligibility changes are often associated with
other changes in socioeconomic circumstances (such as changes in income, private
insurance status, and marital status of the parent) that are difﬁcult to observe in
administrative data but may  independently affect health care utilization. For exam-
ple,  children who newly enroll in Medicaid due to a drop in parent’s income (and
perhaps loss in private health insurance) may have utilization that is incorrectly
attributed to the managed care or FFS arrangement rather than the drop in income.
On the other hand, children who  are made eligible for Medicaid due to marital disso-
lution may  be less likely to use health care due to the increased time constraints on
the single parent. Second, lagged insurance coverage could affect current utilization.
For example, uninsured children who enroll in Medicaid may initially have increased
utilization due to pent-up health care demand, yet this could be incorrectly identi-
ﬁed as a HMO  effect. Third, as Cutler and Gruber (1996) note, there are children who
are eligible, but not participating in the Medicaid program who might be viewed
as  having conditional Medicaid coverage. What this means is that when the child
gets sick, it may  be relatively easy to enroll the child in Medicaid. Similar to the
pent-up demand story, conditional coverage may  incorrectly attribute utilization
to  managed care or FFS plans. For each of these reasons, the results from an analysis
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partially enrolled children. The results are unchanged from what
we present.
While this alternative approach is promising, there is one ﬁnal
issue to be addressed: whether or not it makes sense to model the
managed care “treatments” in each region as being homogeneous.
Our prior description of the differences in plan characteristics
across the two regions clearly suggests that we should model the
impact of managed care in each region separately. Our use of sepa-
rate border county FFS control groups for each region should handle
other baseline differences between the two regions, such as differ-
ences in baseline utilization.
To summarize our empirical strategy, we  deﬁne separate treat-
ment and control shared-border counties for each of the two
managed care regions and track the utilization of all children that
(i) live in those counties in January 1997 and (ii) are continuously
enrolled in Medicaid until June 1999. Fig. 2 illustrates the 4 Passport
treatment and 7 control counties as well as the 9 KHS treatment
and 14 control counties used in this analysis.22 Table 4 provides
a descriptive comparison of the treatment and control counties
using “QuickFacts” data from the U.S. Census. The ﬁrst two columns
describe the Passport treatment and control counties, followed by
the KHS treatment and control counties. We  also present descrip-
tions of Passport and KHS counties that share a common border.
For both Passport and KHS, the treatment and control counties are
very similar in terms of measurable county-level characteristics.
Observable differences across the two  regions further motivate
separate Passport and KHS analyses. Finally, it is interesting to
observe how similar the Passport and KHS counties are that share a
common border. Later we  compare the impact of the different man-
aged care “treatments” in each these two  similar sets of counties.
4.2. Empirical model speciﬁcation
The key issue which motivates the instrumental variables
approach we adopt in this paper is that mobility across Ken-
tucky’s 120 counties is non-trivial, and could be correlated with the
implementation of Medicaid managed care. Put differently, loca-
tion could be endogenous to health care utilization and Medicaid
generosity. In the broader literature on welfare beneﬁts, Gelbach
(2004) convincingly ﬁnds that among women likely to use wel-
fare, movers move to higher-beneﬁt states, and do so earlier in
the life cycle. If one believes that state-to-state moves occur due
to differences in cash welfare generosity, then county-to-county
moves (which are clearly less costly for families) due to differences
in Medicaid generosity may  be an important issue to account for.
To do so, we  argue that county of residence in January 1997
is exogenous to the implementation of the Medicaid managed
of non-continuous enrollment spells are likely to be biased if there are differen-
tial take-up rates in managed care and FFS counties. Although we observe long-run
insurance status and utilization far more accurately than previous work, by restric-
ting the sample of Kentucky children to those who  were continuously enrolled, it is
likely that the children are poorer and less mobile than other Medicaid recipients.
In  order to evaluate this formally, we examined data from the Survey of Income and
Program Participation (SIPP) from 1997 to 1999. We ﬁnd that children continuously
enrolled in Medicaid tend to be more disadvantaged than those with intermittent
Medicaid enrollment. Additionally, sources of health insurance coverage for these
children when not formally participating in the Medicaid program varied with the
length of time spent on Medicaid. This suggests that our results based on continu-
ously enrolled children may not be generalizable to the Medicaid population as a
whole.
22 The Passport treatment counties are Breckinridge, Grayson, Larue, and Marion
and the control counties are Hancock, Ohio, Butler, Edmonson, Hart, Green, and
Taylor. The KHS treatment counties are Lincoln, Rockcastle, Jackson, Estill, Powell,
Montgomery, Nicholas, Harrison, and Owen and the control counties are Pulaski,
Laurel, Clay, Owsley, Lee, Wolfe, Menifee, Bath, Fleming, Robertson, Bracken, Pendle-
ton, Grant, and Gallatin.
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Fig. 2. The ﬁnal study counties.
care that occurred in November 1997. This follows the approach
of Aizer et al. (2007) who control for the endogeneity of loca-
tion by assigning Medicaid managed care status based on the ﬁrst
county in which a recipient is observed. Thus, we predict managed
care enrollment separately in each region based on the interac-
tion of two variables: time period (pre- or post-implementation)
and whether the initial county of residence becomes a managed
care county. In other words, in each region we are using managed
care eligibility based on county of residence in January 1997 as an
instrument for actual managed care enrollment. This exogenous
eligibility measure should not affect health care utilization except
through its effect on actual managed care enrollment.
Our ﬁrst stage models for each region, estimated as linear prob-
ability models, are given below:
HMOijt = ˇ0 + ˇ1HMO  elig Passport initial countyit + ˇ2Age 6
− 12it + ˇ3Age 13 − 18it + Month Year Dummiesˇ4
+ ˛i + εijt (1a)
Table 4
Final study county comparisons using the census.
Passport
treatment
Passport
control
KHS treatment KHS control Passport
counties
(shared border)
KHS counties
(shared border)
Total population, 2006 77 112 147 253 126 119
Average county population 19 16 16 18 25 30
White  (%) 93.9 95.0 96.5 96.3 89.3 89.0
Living  in same house, 1995 and 2000 (%) 60.7 62.1 58.2 59.6 54.2 53.0
High  school graduates in 2000 (%) 67.7 64.6 63.7 63.4 76.9 78.0
Homeownership in 2000 (%) 79.1 78.5 75.5 76.6 77.1 70.3
Poverty  rate in 2004 (%) 16.7 17.8 19.0 20.6 12.1 12.7
Counties Breckinridge,
Grayson, Larue,
Marion
Butler,
Edmonson,
Green, Hart,
Hancock, Ohio,
Taylor
Estill, Harrison,
Jackson,
Lincoln,
Montgomery,
Nicholas,
Owen, Powell,
Rockcastle
Bath, Bracken, Clay,
Fleming, Gallatin,
Grant, Laurel, Lee,
Menifee, Owsley,
Pendleton, Pulaski,
Robertson, Wolfe
Henry, Nelson,
Shelby,
Spencer,
Washington
Anderson,
Boyle, Franklin,
Mercer
Source: U.S. Census QuickFacts data for Kentucky: http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/21000.html.
Notes: Population measured in thousands.
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HMOijt = ˇ0 + ˇ1HMO  elig KHS initial countyit + ˇ2Age 6 − 12it
+ ˇ3Age 13 − 18it + Month Year Dummiesˇ4 + ˛i + εijt
(1b)
where HMO  represents actual managed care enrollment for child
i in county j at time t, HMO  elig Passport initial county represents
Passport eligibility for child i based on initial county of residence
and current time period (i.e. it equals 1 if the child initially resided in
a Passport county and the time period is November 1997 onward),
HMO elig KHS initial county represents KHS eligibility for child i
based on initial county of residence and current time period, and
Month Year Dummies is a vector containing an indicator for each
of the 30 months (January 1997 to June 1999) in our sample.23
We  also include two indicators for different child age groupings,
child ﬁxed effects (˛i), and εijt represents a standard error term.
The inclusion of child ﬁxed effects controls for time-invariant
child characteristics that are not observed in our administrative
data.
Our primary second stage speciﬁcation, which examines three
types health care utilization (professional, outpatient, and inpa-
tient services), is also estimated as a separate linear probability
model for each region:
Any Monthly Utilizationijt = ˇ0 + ˇ1HMOijt + ˇ2Age 6 − 12it
+ ˇ3Age 13 − 18it + Month Year Dummiesˇ4 + ˛i + εijt (2)
where Any Monthly Utilizationijt is a dummy  variable equal to 1 if
child i in county j used one of our measures of health care uti-
lization in month t (outpatient, professional, or inpatient), HMO
represents actual HMO  enrollment in our OLS speciﬁcations and
predicted HMO  enrollment from the ﬁrst stage in our IV speciﬁ-
cations, and the other variables are deﬁned as before.24 We  will
modify this speciﬁcation where needed to accommodate different
measures of utilization, such as a measure of the monthly number
of visits or monthly medical expenditures.
5. Data
In order to implement our empirical analysis, we  were provided
with de-identiﬁed, linked Medicaid claims and enrollment data by
the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services. As described
above, for each region our sample consists of children that (i) live
in the region’s treatment or control counties in January 1997 and
(ii) are continuously enrolled in Medicaid until June 1999.25 During
these 30 months, there were no changes in the company managing
the Kentucky Medicaid information systems.
Electronic Data Systems (EDS) was responsible for man-
aging Medicaid information systems for Kentucky from 1994
to 2000 and a new vendor, Unisys, began managing these
databases in January 2000. We  begin our analysis in January 1997
because data prior to that date from EDS were not available.26
23 Recall that a child must be enrolled in Kentucky Medicaid for all 30 months in
order to be included in our sample. Therefore a child that moves from Kentucky to
another state would not be included even if their Medicaid coverage across the two
states was  uninterrupted.
24 For a discussion of the use of linear probability models in two state least squares
estimation see Angrist and Krueger (2001) and Kelejian (1971).
25 Note that we  are not requiring these children to live continuously in one of the
treatment or control counties, only that they maintain Kentucky Medicaid enroll-
ment. Therefore, a child may  live in a Passport treatment county in January 1997
then move to any other part of the state for the remaining 29 months in our analysis
and stay in the sample, as long as they maintain their public coverage.
26 A longer time series of pre-reform data would have been preferable, but
given that we  have micro-level data measured at the monthly level, ten months
During transitions to new vendors with new database models,
the medical claims information goes through a testing and ver-
iﬁcation period for about one year. We are not conﬁdent in
the comparability of the new Unisys database with the previ-
ous system during this intermediate period, which is why we
end our analysis in June 1999 (several months before the transi-
tion). The beneﬁts of using this timeframe include the fact that
it spans the reform we  are investigating and we are assured the
changes in utilization we observe are not being driven by vendor
changes. The cost is that we cannot observe longer-run utilization
changes.
After dropping a few children with age discrepancies, we are
left with 4706 children in our Passport sample (1890 initially in
one of the 4 Passport treatment counties we  are interested in and
2816 initially in one of the 7 control counties) and 13,590 chil-
dren in our KHS sample (4273 initially living in one of the 9 KHS
treatment counties we are interested in and 9317 initially living in
one of the 14 control counties). Descriptive statistics from our ﬁnal
samples for each region (split into treatment and control sample
sub-categories) are shown in Table 5. Comparing the 1890 children
initially in a Passport county with the 2816 initially in a border-
ing FFS county, we see that there was a slightly lower probability
of moving across county lines among the Passport children (24
percent versus 26 percent). On the other hand, there are more
movers among the children initially in a KHS county than their FFS
controls. The amount of moving that we observe in both regions
reinforces the motivation for our IV approach to control for migra-
tion endogeneity.27 Table 5 reinforces the ﬁnding from Table 4 that
we are comparing extremely homogenous sets of counties within
each region. The children in our ﬁnal Passport and KHS samples
appear extremely similar to their FFS controls in terms of demo-
graphics and pre-reform utilization.
Our health care utilization data – which is recorded regard-
less of whether the payment arrangement is FFS or managed care
– is at the monthly level. Inpatient services are deﬁned to be
services delivered in a hospital with an overnight stay, while out-
patient services are services delivered in clinics or hospitals in
which there is no overnight stay (such as an ER visit). Profes-
sional services typically represent physician services, but could
also include services provided at locations other than physician
ofﬁces, such as dental clinics and public health clinics. The bot-
tom of Table 5 presents the monthly utilization rates for each type
of service in the pre-period (January 1997–October 1997) and the
post-period (November 1997–June 1999) for children in each set
of counties of interest. These simple summary statistics in many
ways tell the entire story. We  see large reductions in outpatient
and professional utilization for children initially living in the Pass-
port counties that is not matched by children initially living in
the non-Passport border counties. Children initially living in the
KHS counties, while experiencing some reduction in outpatient uti-
lization, actually have a slight increase in professional utilization.
They tend to look much more similar to children initially in the
non-KHS border counties (i.e., children continuing to receive FFS
Medicaid).
of pre-reform utilization data allows us to sufﬁciently investigate the “common
trendsa¨ssumption that is important in any difference-in-differences analysis.
27 These high mobility rates can be corroborated with other data sets. Using the
43,111 unique Kentucky respondents in the 2008 American Community Survey
(ACS), we ﬁnd that nearly 16 percent of the sample moved in the last year, with
approximately 80 percent being within-state moves. Almost half of the within-
state moves were from one of Kentucky’s 30 Public Use Microdata Areas (PUMA)
to  another. In the ACS, migration rates were higher among children (17 percent
moved), and especially high among poor children (26 percent moved).
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Table 5
Summary statistics using Kentucky administrative data.
Children initially in a
Passport treatment
county
Children initially in a Passport
control county
Children initially in a
KHS treatment county
Children initially in a
KHS control county
# children 1890 2816 4273 9317
#  child months (30 months total) 56,700 84,480 128,190 279,510
%  of children that switched county 23.9 26.0 25.2*** 20.6
Demographics:
Age  on January 1, 1996 7.1* 6.8 7.1 7.1
%  non-white 11.1 9.7 6.5 5.9
%  female 48.9** 45.6 46.7 47.5
Number of siblings 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7
Any  Utilization? (percentage with any monthly Medicaid utilization):
Outpatient Utilization – Pre-reform 9.8%*** 8.6% 10.4%*** 9.5%
Outpatient Utilization – Post-reform 5.2%*** 8.0% 8.2%*** 9.0%
Professional Utilization – Pre-reform 37.6%*** 35.1% 32.2%*** 36.1%
Professional Utilization – Post-reform 24.8%*** 34.3% 32.5%*** 35.5%
Inpatient Utilization – Pre-reform 0.5% 0.6% 0.4%*** 0.5%
Inpatient Utilization – Post-reform 0.3%*** 0.4% 0.3%*** 0.4%
Well  Child Visit Utilization – Pre-reform 3.9%** 3.4% 4.5%*** 5.2%
Well  Child Visit Utilization – Post-reform 3.4%*** 2.3% 2.6%*** 2.8%
Utilization Count? (number of monthly Medicaid visits):
Outpatient visits – Pre-reform 0.126*** 0.107 0.130*** 0.123
Outpatient visits – Post-reform 0.067*** 0.100 0.120** 0.116
Professional visits – Pre-reform 0.699*** 0.604 0.560*** 0.650
Professional visits – Post-reform 0.520*** 0.642 0.604*** 0.684
Inpatient visits – Pre-reform 0.006 0.007 0.004*** 0.006
Inpatient visits – Post-reform 0.003*** 0.005 0.004*** 0.005
Well  Child visits – Pre-reform 0.042** 0.037 0.048*** 0.055
Well  Child visits – Post-reform 0.040*** 0.025 0.031 0.030
Expenditures | Expenditures > 0? (amount of monthly Medicaid spending):
Outpatient spending – Pre-reform $226.09 $247.93 $186.73*** $211.85
Outpatient spending – Post-reform $160.13*** $254.89 $191.87*** $256.31
Professional spending – Pre-reform $120.76*** $150.69 $113.01*** $123.96
Professional spending – Post-reform $182.15* $168.96 $134.57*** $144.26
Inpatient spending – Pre-reform $2551.12 $2526.10 $3194.84 $2750.84
Inpatient spending – Post-reform $2502.06 $2403.74 $2603.59*** $3238.53
Source: De-identiﬁed, linked Medicaid claims and enrollment data provided by the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services.
Notes: The pre-reform time period is January 1997 to October 1997 while the post-reform time period is November 1997 to June 1999. The stars represent the results of tests
for  difference in means or proportions between the treatment and control counties within each region.
* Statistically signiﬁcant difference at 10% level.
** Statistically signiﬁcant difference at 5% level.
*** Statistically signiﬁcant difference at 1% level.
6. Results
In this section we report our empirical results and in the next
section we discuss a series of speciﬁcation checks. We  then syn-
thesize the results and discuss how they contribute to the previous
literature.
6.1. Effects of HMO  enrollment on health care utilization –
descriptive evidence
The heterogeneous impact of the two different managed care
“treatments” is made especially clear in Figs. 3 and 4. Fig. 3 com-
pares for each of the three types of services differences in the
monthly utilization rate for the 1890 children initially living in a
Passport county (labeled “treatment”) to the utilization rate for
the 2816 children initially living in a non-Passport border county
(labeled “control”). We  see similar utilization rates in the pre-
period for each type of service in both the treatment and control
groups (visual support for the “common trends” assumption) and
then striking reductions in outpatient and professional utilization
for the Passport treatments relative to their controls. There seems
to be less of a managed care impact on inpatient utilization, but the
extremely low baseline utilization rate makes the possibility of a
signiﬁcant reduction less likely, as does the fact that inpatient stays
were still reimbursed on a FFS schedule with a withhold, rather
than with a capitated payment.
Fig. 4 provides the same comparison for our KHS treatment
and control samples. These graphs clearly tell a different story. We
again see similar utilization rates between the treatment and con-
trol counties in the pre-period. The KHS pre-period utilization rates
also appear to be very similar to the Passport pre-period utilization
rates, with slightly lower outpatient and professional rates and a
slightly higher inpatient rate. In the post-period, we see very lit-
tle difference between the KHS treatment utilization rates and the
controls. Therefore, these graphs suggest a very strong impact of
the managed care treatment associated with the Passport program
and almost no impact of the managed care treatment associated
with the KHS program.
6.2. Effects of HMO enrollment on health care utilization –
extensive margin regressions
The top panel of Table 6 presents the results of a series of
regressions based on equation (2) for the Passport region where
the dependent variable in each model is a (0, 1) indicator of any
monthly utilization of professional, outpatient, or inpatient Med-
icaid services. The key independent variable of interest is managed
care enrollment (HMO). In order to isolate the effect of the Passport
managed care program on utilization, each model includes a series
of month year dummies and child ﬁxed effects. The OLS estimate
presented in column 1a suggests that the introduction of the Pass-
port program led to a statistically signiﬁcant 16 percentage point
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Table  6
Effects of HMO  enrollment on health care utilization – extensive margin.
Passport
Any professional visits? Any outpatient visits? Any inpatient visits?
OLS (1a) IV (1b) OLS (2a) IV (2b) OLS (3a) IV (3b)
HMO  enrollment −0.159*** (0.007) −0.174*** (0.007) −0.055 *** (0.003) −0.060*** (0.004) −0.001 (0.001) −0.001 (0.001)
30  month–year dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child  ﬁxed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pre-reform avg. monthly utilization rate: 36% 36% 9% 9% 0.6% 0.6%
Percent  change: −44% −48% −61% −66% −20% −24%
KHS
Any professional visits? Any outpatient visits? Any inpatient visits?
OLS (1c) IV (1d) OLS (2c) IV (2d) OLS (3c) IV (3d)
HMO  enrollment 0.021*** (0.004) 0.012*** (0.004) −0.016*** (0.002) −0.021*** (0.002) 0.001 (0.0005) 0.001 (0.001)
30  month–year dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child  ﬁxed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pre-reform avg. monthly utilization rate: 35% 35% 10% 10% 0.5% 0.5%
Percent  change: 6% 3% −17% −21% 14% 15%
Source: De-identiﬁed, linked Medicaid claims and enrollment data provided by the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services.
Notes: These regressions also include monthly controls for child age. Standard errors are in parentheses. Passport regressions include 4706 children followed for 30 months
(N  = 141,180), while the KHS regressions include 13,590 children followed for 30 months (N = 407,700).
*  Statistically signiﬁcant difference at 10% level.
**  Statistically signiﬁcant difference at 5% level.
*** Statistically signiﬁcant difference at 1% level.
decline in the probability of any Medicaid professional utilization
for the children in our sample. This is relative to a monthly pro-
fessional utilization rate of 36% in the pre-reform period, thus
representing a 44% reduction in the overall monthly probability
of any Medicaid professional utilization. The other OLS estimates
suggest a statistically signiﬁcant 5.5 percentage point decline (61%
reduction) in the monthly probability of any outpatient utilization
and a more modest 0.1 percentage point decline (20% reduction)
decline in the monthly probability of any inpatient utilization.
Table 6 also presents results of a similar speciﬁcation estimated
using our Kentucky Health Select (KHS) sample. The OLS estimate
presented in column 1c suggests that the introduction of the KHS
program actually led to a statistically signiﬁcant 2 percentage point
increase (6% increase relative to baseline) in the probability of any
Medicaid professional utilization. The other OLS estimates suggest
a statistically signiﬁcant 2 percentage point decline (17% relative to
the pre-reform baseline) in the monthly probability of any outpa-
tient utilization and a 0.1 percentage point increase (14% increase)
in the monthly probability of any inpatient utilization.28
Identiﬁcation in the OLS models is achieved through the
assumption that this Medicaid reform in Kentucky is an exoge-
nous change to insurance type, not driven in a given county by
some sort of related changes in Medicaid spending/utilization
(policy endogeneity) or because of changes in the characteris-
tics of recipients (migration endogeneity).29 In our IV models we
28 Although outpatient and inpatient services were not capitated under the Pass-
port plan, one would expect that both the capitation of primary care providers and
their role as gatekeepers, as well as other aspects of managed care, such as utilization
review, would have an effect on these services. As discussed in Baicker et al. (2013),
the literature on managed care spillover suggests that such effects are important to
consider.
29 As is argued in Duggan (2004) in the case of California, one could argue in Ken-
tucky that since the planning for the introduction of managed care preceded the
actual implementation by multiple years, policy endogeneity is unlikely to be a
major issue. Moreover, the cost dynamics in these border counties are likely to have
been far less important in policy decisions than the urban centers of the managed
care regions.
address migration endogeneity by instrumenting actual managed
care enrollment with Passport or KHS eligibility based on initial
county of residence.30 Because we ﬁrst observe each child in our
sample in January 1997, our identifying assumption is that their
county of residence in January 1997 is exogenous to the implemen-
tation of managed care in November 1997.31 The results reported
in Table 6 illustrate that using an IV approach leaves the coefﬁcient
estimates largely unchanged. This suggests migration endogeneity
is not a major source of bias to our OLS estimates of the impact
of Passport and KHS on health care utilization. Although we  do
observe children moving, those moves do not appear to be moti-
vated by differences in Medicaid provision across counties.
Our primary results suggest that both Passport and KHS
decreased outpatient utilization among the children in our sample
along the extensive margin, though Passport was  able to do so to a
greater degree (61% reduction versus 17% reduction). In addition,
both programs appear to have had a minimal impact on inpatient
care utilization for children along the extensive margin, which is
probably not surprising given the low overall utilization of inpa-
tient services for children. A key difference between the effects of
the two programs is that Passport reduced professional utilization
by 44% along the extensive margin, while KHS actually increased
professional utilization by 6%. We  now consider changes along the
intensive margin and changes in health care spending. Given that
migration endogeneity and policy endogenity do not appear to bias
30 Aizer et al. (2007) take a similar approach to control for the endogeneity of
location by assigning managed care status to each woman in their sample based on
the  ﬁrst county in which she is observed.
31 Appendix Table A2 presents the results of the ﬁrst stage regressions in which
Passport or KHS eligibility based on initial county of residence is used to predict
actual managed care enrollment (HMO). The instrument is clearly a very strong
predictor of actual managed care enrollment with a marginal managed care par-
ticipation rate of 69 percent for Passport and 79 percent for KHS. The estimated
marginal take-up rate is not 100 percent in either case because of difﬁculty in
measuring managed care enrollment in the ﬁrst 4 months of the reform and some
children moving across county lines, potentially into the adjacent managed care
area.
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Fig. 3. Child healthcare utilization before and after Passport.
our results, we do not instrument for HMO  status in our subsequent
analysis.32
6.3. Effects of HMO  enrollment on health care utilization –
intensive margin regressions
In order to analyze changes along the intensive margin, we
modify Eq. (2) by replacing the dependent variable with a count
for the number of monthly professional, outpatient, or inpa-
tient visits. Since each of these dependent variables includes a
large number of zeros, we estimate these regressions as Poisson
32 This ﬁnding with respect to migration endogeneity mirrors the results of a study
(Schwartz and Sommers, 2014) that investigates changes in state-to-state migration
after recent public insurance expansions.
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Fig. 4. Child healthcare utilization before and after KHS.
models. The results of the Poisson models for both Passport and
KHS are given in Table 7, where the marginal effects associated
with HMO  enrollment are presented for each outcome of interest.
Similar to the impact along the extensive margin, the intro-
duction of the Passport program led to reductions in the number
of monthly professional, outpatient, and inpatient visits along the
intensive margin, with all three reductions being statistically sig-
niﬁcant in this case. We see no statistically signiﬁcant change in
the number of outpatient or inpatient visits associated with the
KHS plan, but a statistically signiﬁcant increase in the number
of monthly professional visits. Thus, the KHS plan was  associated
with increases in professional visits along both the intensive and
extensive margin, while the Passport plan was associated with
reductions in professional visits along both margins.
J. Marton et al. / Journal of Health Economics 36 (2014) 47–68 59
Table  7
Effects of HMO  enrollment on health care utilization – intensive margin.
Passport
Number of professional visits (1a) Number of outpatient visits (2a) Number of inpatient visits (3a)
HMO  enrollment −0.398*** (0.033) −0.650 *** (0.059) −0.210** (0.106)
30  month–year dummies? Yes Yes Yes
Child  ﬁxed effects? Yes Yes Yes
Sample size: 137,910 100,530 13,680
KHS
Number of professional visits (1b) Number of outpatient visits (2b) Number of inpatient visits (3b)
HMO  Enrollment 0.059** (0.023) 0.002 (0.025) 0.086 (0.095)
30  month–year dummies? Yes Yes Yes
Child ﬁxed effects? Yes Yes Yes
Sample size: 397,140 302,550 35,790
Source: De-identiﬁed, linked Medicaid claims and enrollment data provided by the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services.
Notes: These regressions are all estimated as Poisson models and include monthly controls for child age. Standard errors are in parentheses.
*  Statistically signiﬁcant difference at 10% level.
** Statistically signiﬁcant difference at 5% level.
*** Statistically signiﬁcant difference at 1% level.
6.4. Effect of HMO  enrollment on health care spending
Next we turn our attention to the effects of HMO  enrollment
on monthly health care spending. The results reported in Table 6
can be viewed as changes in health care spending along the exten-
sive margin. In other words, those results tell us whether or not
managed care had an impact on the likelihood that an enrollee had
any monthly health care expenditure. The estimates presented in
Table 8 focus on the intensive margin; those months in which a
patient had positive expenditures. These results come from a mod-
iﬁed version of Eq. (2) where the dependent variable is the log of
monthly spending on professional, outpatient, or inpatient care,
conditional on having non-zero monthly spending. We estimate
each equation using OLS. Table 8 suggests that both programs led
to statistically signiﬁcant reductions in monthly health care spend-
ing, conditional on non-zero monthly spending. The magnitude of
the effect is larger for Passport than KHS.
We also take an alternate approach to model monthly health
care spending that allows us to determine where on the distribu-
tion of medical spending any observed reductions in utilization are
coming from. For example, is the 61% reduction in the monthly
probability of consuming any outpatient services observed in the
Passport region achieved by reducing utilization among “heavy”
users of outpatient services? The regressions reported in Table 9
address this question for outpatient and professional services in
both the Passport and KHS regions. We  create new dependent
variables equal to 1 in months where the child’s professional or
outpatient Medicaid spending exceed the 50th percentile of the
respective monthly spending distribution (conditional on having
positive spending). In the ﬁrst column, the dependent variable
equals 1 in a given month if a child has professional service
spending/claims above $50 (approximately the 50th percentile
of professional spending), and in second column the dependent
variable equals 1 if in a given month a child has outpatient
spending/claims above $100 (approximately the 50th percentile
of outpatient spending).
Table 9 reports that Passport led to a 92% reduction in the prob-
ability of having monthly outpatient spending above $100. This
suggests a far stronger impact of Passport on outpatient utiliza-
tion for those with relatively high outpatient spending/claims. For
professional services we see that Passport focuses on the left tail of
the distribution. Passport leads to a 32% reduction in the probability
of having any monthly professional spending above $50, as com-
pared to a 44% reduction in the probability of having any monthly
professional spending (Table 6). For KHS, more of the action for
both outpatient and professional spending is coming from high
spenders, though the interpretation differs because the signs differ.
The reduction in the overall probability of any monthly outpatient
spending for KHS is driven more strongly by reductions among the
high spenders, while the increase in the overall probability of any
monthly professional spending is being driven more strongly by
increases among the high spenders.
6.5. Effect of HMO enrollment on well child utilization – extensive
and intensive margins
While our previous results examine broad categories of uti-
lization, one speciﬁc type of service is of particular interest, well
child ofﬁce visits.33 If managed or Accountable Care Organizations
want to reduce utilization through improvements in preventive
care, then we would expect them to promote such ofﬁce visits.
There may  be some concern, however, that the incentives created
by the Passport capitation of primary care providers may reduce
such visits.
Table 10 examines the impact of the introduction of Passport
and KHS on monthly well child utilization along both the extensive
and intensive margins. Both plans increased both the probability
of having a monthly well child visit (extensive margin) as well as
the number of well child visits received (intensive margin). The
magnitudes of the increases are larger for Passport than for KHS. In
particular, the introduction of Passport led to a 31% increase in the
probability of having a well child visit in a particular month, while
the introduction of the KHS plan led to a 9% increase.
6.6. Effect of HMO  enrollment on health outcomes
Our Passport results provide compelling evidence that utiliza-
tion can be reduced through the high-powered incentives provided
in typical managed care arrangements. One  common criticism,
however, is that this reduction in utilization comes at a real cost:
patients do not receive some of the appropriate or necessary care
they were getting under FFS. Above we examined a particular type
of service associated with such concerns (well child visits). Now we
33 We deﬁne well child visits as visits identiﬁed with CPT codes 99382, 99393,
99392, 99393 and IDC-9 codes V20.2, V70.0, V70.3, V70.5, V70.6, V70.8, and V70.9,
as  suggested by the National Committee for Quality Assurance (NCQA).
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Table 8
Effects of HMO  enrollment on health care spending (conditional on positive monthly spending).
Passport
Log spending on professional visits (1a) Log spending on outpatient visits (2a) Log spending on inpatient visits (3a)
HMO  enrollment −0.19*** (0.03) −1.26*** (0.07) −0.82** (0.27)
30  month–year dummies? Yes Yes Yes
Child ﬁxed effects? Yes Yes Yes
Sample size: 45,690 10,719 614
Avg.  monthly spending: $160.21 $231.16 $2476.60
Marginal effect: −17% −72% −56%
KHS
Log spending on professional visits (1b) Log spending on outpatient visits (2b) Log spending on inpatient visits (3b)
HMO  enrollment −0.10*** (0.02) −0.36*** (0.03) −0.38* (0.20)
30  month–year dummies? Yes Yes Yes
Child ﬁxed effects? Yes Yes Yes
Sample size: 141,377 37,029 1714
Avg.  monthly spending: $134.48 $225.09 $2987.70
Marginal effect: −9% −30% −31%
Source: De-identiﬁed, linked Medicaid claims and enrollment data provided by the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services.
Notes: These regressions are estimated using OLS and include monthly controls for child age. Standard errors are in parentheses.
* Statistically signiﬁcant difference at 10% level.
** Statistically signiﬁcant difference at 5% level.
*** Statistically signiﬁcant difference at 1% level.
Table 9
Effects of HMO  enrollment on large health care spenders.
Passport
Indicator for expenditure of $50 or more
on professional visits during month
Indicator for expenditure of $100 or more
on outpatient visits during month
HMO  −0.060*** (0.005) −0.050*** (0.002)
30  month–year dummies? Yes Yes
Child ﬁxed effects? Yes Yes
Pre-reform avg. monthly utilization rate: 18.7% 4.3%
Percent change: −32% −92%
KHS
Indicator for expenditure of $50 or more
on professional visits during month
Indicator for expenditure of $100 or more
on outpatient visits during month
HMO  0.016*** (0.002) −0.019*** (0.001)
30  Month–Year Dummies? Yes Yes
Child Fixed Effects? Yes Yes
Pre-reform avg. monthly utilization rate: 17.34% 5.11%
Percent change: 9% −37%
Source: De-identiﬁed, linked Medicaid claims and enrollment data provided by the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services.
Notes: Sample includes all 4706 children from the Passport sample, for all 30 months.
*  Statistically signiﬁcant difference at 10% level.
** Statistically signiﬁcant difference at 5% level.
*** Statistically signiﬁcant difference at 1% level.
examine a particular type of enrollee, children with asthma. If the
utilization reductions in Passport we observe imply poorer primary
care for this vulnerable population, we would expect a higher hos-
pitalization rate after Passport is implemented among this group
(Aizer and Currie, 2002; Aizer, 2007).
Table 11A provides regression results on utilization for various
groupings of Kentucky counties. The ﬁrst set of columns breaks out
the 4706 children from the 4 treatment and 7 control counties for
Passport into 323 asthmatic children and 4383 others.34 As in the
full sample, we see no statistically signiﬁcant change in inpatient
utilization for asthmatics along the extensive margin. Asthmatics
also have similar changes in outpatient and professional utilization.
34 We deﬁne an asthmatic as a child with at least one occurrence of the ICD-9 code
associated with asthma (493) in the 10 month pre-reform time period.
For comparative purposes, the second column reports the regres-
sion results for the non-asthmatic children.
Because the asthmatic sample size is relatively small, we
expanded the sample in two  ways. First, we expand the sample to
include all 30 month enrolled children in all 16 Passport counties
as the treatment group and all 30 month enrolled children in all
19 Region 4 counties to the south (see Fig. 1) as the control group.
As the second set of columns show, this increases the number of
asthmatics to 2027, but the basic conclusions do not change. Sec-
ond, we  also expand the sample by including all 30 month enrolled
children in Regions 4 (19 counties) and 2 (12 counties) as the con-
trol group. The third set of columns show that this increases the
number of asthmatics to 2447. Again the results do not change.
Because we  ﬁnd that hospitalizations did not go up for asthmatic
children, we take this as suggestive, but certainly not conclusive,
evidence that there were not detrimental health impacts associated
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Table  10
Effects of HMO  enrollment on well child utilization – intensive and extensive margins.
Passport
Any well child visits? (1a) Number of well child visits (1b)
HMO  enrollment 0.011*** (0.002) 0.287*** (0.048)
30  month–year dummies? Yes Yes
Child ﬁxed effects? Yes Yes
Sample size: 141,180 73,020
Pre-reform avg. monthly utilization rate 4%
Percent change: 31%
KHS
Any well child visits? (2a) Number of well child visits (2b)
HMO  enrollment 0.004*** (0.001) 0.127*** (0.024)
30  month–year dummies? Yes Yes
Child ﬁxed effects? Yes Yes
Sample size: 407,700 226,770
Pre-reform avg. monthly utilization rate 5%
Percent change: 9%
Source: De-identiﬁed, linked Medicaid claims and enrollment data provided by the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services.
Notes: These regressions also include monthly controls for child age. The regressions on the left are estimated as linear probability models using OLS and the regressions on
the  right are estimated as Poisson models. Standard errors are in parentheses.
*  Statistically signiﬁcant difference at 10% level.
**  Statistically signiﬁcant difference at 5% level.
*** Statistically signiﬁcant difference at 1% level.
Table 11A
The impact of passport managed care on asthmatic children and all other children.
(1) Original treatment and control
counties
(2) All 16 Passport counties versus
all 19 region 4 counties
(3) All 16 Passport counties versus
all 19 region 2 and all 12 region 4
counties
Asthmatic children All other children Asthmatic children All other children Asthmatic children All other children
Any professional visits? −0.238*** (0.019) −0.155*** (0.005) −0.130*** (0.007) −0.071*** (0.001) −0.141*** (0.006) −0.073*** (0.001)
Baseline rate: 57% 35% 54% 29% 55% 30%
Percent  change: −42% −44% −24% −24% −26% −24%
Any  outpatient visits? −0.107*** (0.013) −0.052*** (0.003) −0.051*** (0.005) −0.030*** (0.001) −0.056*** (0.004) −0.032*** (0.001)
Baseline rate: 17% 8% 17% 7% 17% 7%
Percent  change: −63% −65% −30% −43% −33% −46%
Any  inpatient visits? −0.0001 (0.005) −0.0014*** (0.001) −0.004** (0.002) −0.001*** (0.0002) −0.003* (0.002) −0.001*** (0.0002)
Baseline rate: 3.0% 0.4% 2.8% 0.4% 2.8% 0.4%
Percent  change: −.4% −36% −16% −16% −11% −17%
Source: De-identiﬁed, linked Medicaid claims and enrollment data provided by the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services.
Notes: The OLS regressions in this table estimate similar models to those in Table 6. The ﬁrst set of results divides the sample of 4706 children into asthmatic children
(N  = 323), and all others (N = 4383). The second set of results – with a larger geographic coverage – examines 2027 asthmatic children compared to 31,305 other children.
The  ﬁnal set of results examines 2447 asthmatic children compared to 38,840 other children. Three stars, two stars, and one star imply statistically signiﬁcant parameter
estimates at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Table 11B
The impact of KHS managed care on asthmatic children and all other children.
(1) Original treatment and control
counties
(2) All 16 KHS counties versus all
33 region 7 and 8 counties
(3) All 16 KHS Counties versus all
39 region 6, 7 and 8 counties
Asthmatic children All other children Asthmatic children All other children Asthmatic children All other children
Any professional visits? 0.021 (0.022) 0.021*** (0.004) −0.009 (0.011) 0.004 (0.002) −0.008 (0.011) 0.004* (0.002)
Baseline  rate: 59% 34% 58% 33% 58% 33%
Percent change: 4% 6% −2% 1% −1% 1%
Any  Outpatient Visits? −0.045*** (0.014) −0.015*** (0.002) −0.020*** (0.006) −0.008*** (0.001) −0.019*** (0.006) −0.008*** (0.001)
Baseline rate: 21% 9% 21% 10% 21% 10%
Percent change: −21% −16% −10% −8% −9% −8%
Any  Inpatient Visits? −0.0006 (0.004) 0.0007 (0.0004) 0.0079*** (0.0020) 0.0006** (0.0003) 0.0074*** (0.002) 0.0006** (0.0002)
Baseline rate: 2.0% 0.4% 3.3% 0.5% 3.3% 0.5%
Percent change: −3% 16% 24% 12% 23% 11%
Source: De-identiﬁed, linked Medicaid claims and enrollment data provided by the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services. Notes: The OLS regressions in this table
estimate similar models to those in Table 6. The ﬁrst set of results divides the sample of 13,590 children into asthmatic children (N = 664), and all others (N = 12,926). The
second  set of results – with a larger geographic coverage – examines 4168 asthmatic children compared to 47,374 other children. The ﬁnal set of results examines 4481
asthmatic children compared to 51,833 other children.
* Statistically signiﬁcant difference at 10% level.
** Statistically signiﬁcant difference at 5% level.
*** Statistically signiﬁcant difference at 1% level.
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Table 12
Speciﬁcation check – allow for partial enrollment effects of HMO enrollment on health care utilization – extensive margin.
Passport
Any professional visits? Any outpatient visits? Any inpatient visits?
OLS (1a) IV (1b) OLS (2a) IV (2b) OLS (3a) IV (3b)
HMO enrollment −0.141*** (0.005) −0.158*** (0.005) −0.047*** (0.003) −0.052*** (0.003) −0.0001 (0.001) 0.0003 (0.001)
30  month–year dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child  ﬁxed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pre-reform avg. monthly utilization rate: 35% 35% 9% 9% 0.7% 0.7%
Percent  change: −40% −45% −52% −57% −1% 4%
KHS
Any professional visits? Any outpatient visits? Any inpatient visits?
OLS (1c) IV (1d) OLS (2c) IV (2d) OLS (3c) IV (3d)
HMO enrollment 0.013*** (0.003) 0.007** (0.003) −0.014*** (0.002) −0.019*** (0.002) 0.0003 (0.0004) 0.0004 (0.0005)
30  month–year dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child  ﬁxed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pre-reform avg. monthly utilization rate: 34% 34% 10% 10% 0.6% 0.6%
Percent  change: 4% 2% −14% −19% 5% 7%
Source: De-identiﬁed, linked Medicaid claims and enrollment data provided by the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services.
Notes: These regressions also include monthly controls for child age. Standard errors are in parentheses. Passport regressions include 8693 children followed for up to
30  months (N = 234,058), while the KHS regressions include 23,825 children followed for up to 30 months (N = 646,820).
*  Statistically signiﬁcant difference at 10% level.
** Statistically signiﬁcant difference at 5% level.
*** Statistically signiﬁcant difference at 1% level.
with Passport utilization reductions. Table 11B reports the results
of similar analysis for the KHS plan. Splitting our initial KHS sam-
ple into asthmatics and non-asthmatics also shows no statistically
signiﬁcant change in inpatient admissions for asthmatic children.
A full analysis of the health impacts of managed care is beyond the
scope of this paper, but will be the subject of future research.
7. Speciﬁcation checks
In this section we consider a variety of speciﬁcation checks to
test the robustness of our primary results. We  expand our sample
by allowing for children that were partially enrolled and by allow-
ing for children that live in non-border counties. We  then restrict
our sample to a one year post-reform timeframe. Next we  formally
test the common trends assumption associated with difference-
in-differences analysis. We  then examine utilization changes for
children that live on the Passport – KHS border and conclude by
considering changes in provider participation in Medicaid.
7.1. Allow for partial enrollment
Table 12 replicates our primary speciﬁcations estimated in
Table 6 with an expanded sample that allows for children that were
not enrolled in Medicaid for all 30 months in our data. This increases
the number of children in the Passport analysis from 4706 chil-
dren to 8693 children and the KHS sample from 13,590 children to
23,825 children. Focusing on the OLS results, we see that expand-
ing the sample in this way  does not change our primary results.
Passport still led to large reductions in professional and outpatient
utilization, while KHS led to a more modest reduction in outpatient
utilization and an increase in professional utilization. Neither plan
had a statistically signiﬁcant impact on inpatient utilization. This
implies that our primary results are not being driven by selection
into continuous Medicaid coverage over our timeframe.
7.2. Allow for non-border counties
Next we consider how our conclusions would change if we  used
a larger, but more geographically diverse sample. Recall that our
“Passport experiment” used only four of sixteen counties in Region
3 for the treatment group, as well as seven contiguous counties out-
side of Region 3 for the control group. The “KHS experiment” used
nine of twenty-one counties in Region 5 for the treatment group,
and fourteen counties outside of Region 5 for the control group.
In addition, given the differences in plan design, the managed care
“treatment” was fundamentally different in the two  regions.
Table 13 shows the results of expanding the sample using the
same OLS models that were used in Table 6 (the coefﬁcients from
that table are presented in the ﬁrst two  rows of Table 13 as refer-
ence). We  begin by combining the treatment regions, estimating
the effect of managed care without regard to the underlying dif-
ferences between the two regions. As might be expected, the
treatment effect of managed care is essentially a weighted average
of the treatment effects in the two  managed care regions. Over-
all, professional utilization falls by 4 percentage points, far smaller
than the 16 percentage point drop in the Passport region, but a sub-
stantially larger drop than the 2 percentage point increase observed
in the KHS region. The conclusions for outpatient utilization mir-
ror those for professional utilization, while the effect on inpatient
utilization is in all cases insigniﬁcant.
We conclude that ignoring the underlying incentives created
by different forms of managed/accountable care can lead to very
different conclusions about the magnitude of its effect on utiliza-
tion. This implies that studies that ignore such heterogeneity across
MCOs or ACOs, which is often the case in the literature, may  end
up with biased estimates of the impact of such ﬁnancing and care
provision arrangements.
Next, we  expand our sample to include continuously-enrolled
children in all Region 3 and Region 5 counties as the treatment
group, and all continuously-enrolled children in the other six
regions as the control group. It should be clear from our previ-
ous comparison of the eight regions (Table 3) that doing so makes
the treatment and control groups far more heterogeneous. Rel-
ative to the approach of focusing on geographically contiguous
regions, our estimated impacts of managed care are roughly 15 to
20 percent smaller. We  interpret this difference as suggesting that
un-modeled, omitted factors are correlated with both the imple-
mentation of managed care and utilization in the larger sample; for
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Table  13
Speciﬁcation check – allow for non-border counties effects of HMO  enrollment on health care utilization – extensive margin.
Any professional visits? Any outpatient visits? Any inpatient visits?
HMO  enrollment in Passport −0.159*** (0.007) −0.055*** (0.003) −0.001 (0.001)
HMO  enrollment in KHS 0.021*** (0.004) −0.061*** (0.002) 0.001 (0.0005)
HMO  enrollment – Combined Regions −0.035*** (0.004) −0.028*** (0.002) 0.0001 (0.0004)
HMO  enrollment – All 120 Counties, Combined Regions −0.043*** (0.001) −0.022*** (0.001) 0.0002 (0.0002)
Source: De-identiﬁed, linked Medicaid claims and enrollment data provided by the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services.
Notes: All models estimated using our OLS speciﬁcation. The results for Passport and KHS are for the speciﬁcation in Table 6. There are 4706 observations for the Passport
speciﬁcation, 13,590 for the KHS speciﬁcation, 18,296 for the Combined Regions speciﬁcation, and 101,649 for the All Counties, Combined Regions speciﬁcation.
*  Statistically signiﬁcant difference at 10% level.
**  Statistically signiﬁcant difference at 5% level.
*** Statistically signiﬁcant difference at 1% level.
example, it is possible that utilization trends in urban areas trended
differently over time than utilization in rural areas, and the urban
areas also adopted managed care.
7.3. Restrict sample to one year post-reform timeframe
Fig. 3 suggests a dip in outpatient utilization one year after the
implementation of the Passport program (November 1998) that
is larger than the utilization reduction that occurs immediately
after Passport began operating. We  investigate the sensitivity of our
results to this dip by restricting the post-reform timeframe in the
models reported in Table 6 to 12 months. Thus for these models the
pre-reform timeframe is January 1997 through October 1997 (10
months) and the post-reform timeframe is November 1997 through
October 1998 (12 months).
Table 14 shows that restricting the post-reform timeframe to 12
months reduces the magnitude of the Passport reduction in profes-
sional utilization from 44% to 38% and the reduction in outpatient
utilization from 61% to 29%. In both cases the results for profes-
sional and outpatient services are highly statistically signiﬁcant,
while the estimated impact on inpatient utilization is not. Restric-
ting the post-reform timeframe in this way makes almost no change
to the KHS results. Therefore, restricting attention to one year
post-reform does not change our primary result: Passport led to
large reductions in professional and outpatient services that were
not matched by the KHS plan.
7.4. Test for common trends in the pre-period
In order to formally test whether or not there were differen-
tial utilization trends between the treatment and control counties
in each region prior to the reform, we re-estimated the models
reported in Table 6 with a treatment indicator interacted with
dummies for each of the ﬁrst eight months of the pre-reform time
period. As shown in Table 15, in our Passport models for pro-
fessional, outpatient, and inpatient utilization we  cannot reject
the null hypothesis that these pre-reform interaction terms are
jointly equal to zero. In our KHS models we cannot reject this same
null hypothesis in our outpatient and inpatient utilization models.
There does seem to be some evidence of differential trends in pro-
fessional utilization. Overall these results formalize what we can
observe in Figs. 3 and 4, that there do not appear to be major dif-
ferential utilization trends in the pre-reform time period for either
region.
Table 14
Speciﬁcation check – restrict post-reform timeframe to 12 months effects of HMO  enrollment on health care utilization – extensive margin.
Passport
Any professional visits? Any outpatient visits? Any inpatient visits?
OLS (1a) IV (1b) OLS (2a) IV (2b) OLS (3a) IV (3b)
HMO  enrollment −0.139*** (0.007) −0.147*** (0.009) −0.026 *** (0.004) −0.031*** (0.006) 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001)
30  month–year dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child  ﬁxed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pre-reform avg. monthly utilization rate: 36% 36% 9% 9% 0.6% 0.6%
Percent  change: −38% −41% −29% −35% 20% 10%
KHS
Any professional visits? Any outpatient visits? Any inpatient visits?
OLS (1c) IV (1d) OLS (2c) IV (2d) OLS (3c) IV (3d)
HMO  enrollment 0.021*** (0.004) 0.015*** (0.005) −0.019*** (0.002) −0.022*** (0.003) 0.0004 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001)
30  month–year dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child  ﬁxed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pre-reform avg. monthly utilization rate: 35% 35% 10% 10% 0.5% 0.5%
Percent  change: 6% 4% −19% −22% 9% 13%
Source: De-identiﬁed, linked Medicaid claims and enrollment data provided by the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services.
Notes: These regressions also include monthly controls for child age. Standard errors are in parentheses. Passport regressions include 4706 children followed for 22 months
(N  = 103,532), while the KHS regressions include 13,590 children followed for 22 months (N = 298,980).
*  Statistically signiﬁcant difference at 10% level.
**  Statistically signiﬁcant difference at 5% level.
*** Statistically signiﬁcant difference at 1% level.
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Table 15
Speciﬁcation check – testing common pre-reform trends assumption effects of HMO  enrollment on health care utilization – extensive margin.
Passport
Any professional visits? Any outpatient visits? Any inpatient visits?
1(a)  2(a) 3(a)
HMO enrollment −0.159*** −0.055*** −0.001
(0.008) (0.004) (0.001)
Treatment × month 1 interaction −0.012 −0.006 0.001
(0.014) (0.008) (0.003)
Treatment × month 2 interaction 0.012 −0.002 −0.004
(0.015) (0.009) (0.003)
Treatment × month 3 interaction 0.014 0.014 0.0000
(0.014) (0.009) (0.002)
Treatment × month4 interaction 0.019 0.010 −0.002
(0.014) (0.009) (0.002)
Treatment × month 5 interaction 0.010 −0.004 0.004
(0.014) (0.009) (0.002)
Treatment × month 6 interaction −0.025* 0.0002 0.001
(0.014) (0.008) (0.002)
Treatment × month 7 interaction −0.011 0.001 0.003*
(0.014) (0.009) (0.002)
Treatment × month 8 interaction −0.013 −0.006 −0.002
(0.014) (0.008) (0.002)
F  test that all interactions are equal to 0:
Fstat 1.41 0.72 1.48
Pvalue  0.1849 0.6722 0.1583
KHS
Any professional visits? Any outpatient visits? Any inpatient visits?
1(b)  2(b) 3(b)
HMO enrollment 0.0003 −0.015*** 0.029***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.005)
Treatment × month 1 interaction −0.0023* −0.004 0.006
(0.001) (0.006) (0.009)
Treatment × month 2 interaction −0.0002 0.004 0.014
(0.001) (0.006) (0.009)
Treatment × month 3 interaction −0.0033** −0.001 0.024*
(0.001) (0.006) (0.009)
Treatment × month4 interaction 0.00001 0.003 0.021**
(0.002) (0.006) (0.009)
Treatment × month 5 interaction −0.0005 0.001 −0.005
(0.001) (0.006) (0.009)
Treatment × month 6 interaction −0.0001 0.0005 0.028***
(0.001) (0.005) (0.009)
Treatment × month 7 interaction 0.0005 0.009 0.028***
(0.001) (0.005) (0.009)
Treatment × month 8 interaction 0.0003 0.008 −0.009
(0.001) (0.005) (0.009)
F  test that all interactions are equal to 0:
Fstat 1.12 0.7 3.98
Pvalue  0.3452 0.6924 0.0001
Source: De-identiﬁed, linked Medicaid claims and enrollment data provided by the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services.
Notes: These regressions also include monthly controls for child age and interaction terms between indicators for each of the ﬁrst eight months in the data (pre-reform time
period)  and an indicator for those in the treatment group in each region. Standard errors are in parentheses. Passport regressions include 4706 children followed for 30
months (N = 141,180), while the KHS regressions include 13,590 children followed for 30 months (N = 407,700).
* Statistically signiﬁcant difference at 10% level.
** Statistically signiﬁcant difference at 5% level.
*** Statistically signiﬁcant difference at 1% level.
7.5. Comparing treated border counties
As Fig. 1 illustrates, the Passport and KHS regions also share a
border, meaning that as an additional speciﬁcation check we  can
compare utilization pre- and post-reform for 5 Passport (Wash-
ington, Nelson, Spencer, Shelby, and Henry) and 4 KHS (Boyle,
Mercer, Anderson, and Franklin) counties that were excluded from
the previous analysis. The ﬁnal two columns of Table 4 suggest that
these counties are extremely similar, other than the managed care
region they were assigned to. Fig. 5 presents outpatient, profes-
sional, and inpatient utilization comparisons. The ﬁgure suggests
similar utilization rates in both sets of counties prior to the reform,
then stronger utilization reductions in the Passport counties rel-
ative to their KHS neighbors. These graphs therefore lend further
support to the notion that the Passport plan was better able to
reduce utilization than the KHS plan.
7.6. Provider participation
Our ﬁnal speciﬁcation check examines provider participation.
Are the reductions in Passport utilization coming from reduced
access to health care (i.e., fewer providers participating in the
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Fig. 5. Healthcare utilization in bordering Passport and KHS counties.
program), rather than more efﬁcient delivery of services? A man-
aged care network would likely restrict the number of doctors,
but were those restrictions so severe as to cause the reduction we
observe? From the universe of Medicaid recipients in the treat-
ment/control counties, we are able to extract unique provider
identiﬁers. Fig. 6A illustrates that although the number of Med-
icaid providers did not grow in the Passport counties (as they did
in the control counties), they did not shrink either. In addition, the
ﬁgure shows that the number of providers did not abruptly change
with the implementation of managed care, even though utilization
did. The differences in levels seem to reﬂect population size differ-
ences. Fig. 6B shows a similar pattern for the KHS plan. As a result,
it is difﬁcult to believe that the sharp drop in utilization we  observe
within Passport is the result of reduced access.
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Fig. 6. (A) Monthly count of unique medicaid provider identiﬁers in passport (treat-
ment) and non-passport (control) counties. (B) Monthly count of unique medicaid
provider identiﬁers in KHS (treatment) and non-KHS (control) counties.
8. Discussion and conclusion
The unique introduction of managed care in the Kentucky Med-
icaid program allows us to document and analyze organizational
differences between two Medicaid managed care plans that started
at the same time, operated in close proximity to one another, and
served relatively homogeneous sets of enrollees. In particular, we
focus on differences in physician reimbursement systems used by
the two plans because such reimbursement systems are, accord-
ing to Copper and Rebitzer (2002), often considered a “black box
whose internal operation is obscured from view.” We  also con-
sider differences in other administrative functions between the
two plans. Overall, we  ﬁnd that Passport’s choices of using capi-
tation to reimburse primary care physicians and contracting out
some other basic managed care administrative responsibilities to
be more effective in reducing utilization than KHS’s choices to use a
modiﬁed FFS reimbursement scheme and handle all administrative
responsibilities in house.
Whether utilization is measured along the extensive (probabil-
ity of any monthly visits) or intensive margin (number of monthly
visits or monthly expenditure), we ﬁnd that the Passport “capi-
tated” program led to signiﬁcant reductions in professional and
outpatient utilization not matched by the KHS “withhold” plan.
In fact, professional utilization actually increased within the KHS
“withhold” plan. This can likely be explained by differences in the
ﬁnancial incentives PCPs within each plan faced. Due to capita-
tion, the marginal revenue associated with an additional visit was
zero for Passport physicians. In contrast, KHS attempted to incen-
tivize physicians through the use FFS reimbursement with a group
withhold. As predicted by the literature on optimal group size (GRT
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(2004)), the typical group size of 20 that was used by the KHS “with-
hold” plan was much too big to serve as an effective deterrent to
free-riding.
Given the magnitude of the utilization reductions we  observe
within the Passport “capitated” program, we investigated a host of
reasons, besides changes in physician ﬁnancial incentives, which
could explain such reductions. First, we examined whether or not
access to Medicaid-participating physicians fell within the Passport
region. We  found that the number of providers serving our Passport
“capitated” sample remained extremely steady during our 36-
month timeframe. Second, we considered whether or not particular
services of interest (well child visits) or particular populations of
interest (asthmatic children) where differentially targeted within
the Passport “capitated” plan. We  found no change in hospitaliza-
tion rates for asthmatic children and observed an increase in well
child visit utilization, consistent with the idea that managed care
promotes preventive services.
A third concern would be that the utilization reductions we
observe were driven by changes in reporting rather than actual
reductions in service provision. Unlike the California transition
to Medicaid managed care (Aizer et al., 2007; Duggan, 2004),
providers in Kentucky were required to report encounter data and
were given a modest ﬁnancial incentive to do so. From the per-
spective of the plans, both Passport and KHS had strong incentives
to measure their provision of care as such information would be
useful in negotiating future capitation rates with the state.
One may  also wonder if there are ﬂaws in our “quasi-
experimental” research design. Relative to other investigations
of Medicaid managed care we would argue we have a number
of advantages. First, unlike within California, enrollment in man-
aged care in Kentucky was mandatory for virtually all children in
the “treatment” counties. Second, as shown, our “treatment” and
“control” counties are extremely balanced on observable character-
istics. Third, the implications of our story stand up to all robustness
checks that we investigated – including partial Medicaid spells,
expanding to a broader set of counties, testing pre-existing trends,
etc.
Thus, at the end of the day, we then are left with the most likely
story: ﬁnancial incentives for physicians – which are transparently
laid out in the Kentucky context but not others – matters greatly
for utilization. The utilization declines found in our study stand
in contrast with the zero or positive expenditure ﬁndings in other
Medicaid managed care studies (Duggan, 2004; Herring and Adams,
2011; Duggan and Hayford, 2013). Although there are many dif-
ferences between the studies, including the nature of the reforms
and populations being analyzed, this contrast may  highlight the
importance of the distinction between true resource utilization (Q)
and negotiated reimbursement levels (P) that impact expenditures
(P × Q).
That being said, there is more work that needs to be done to bet-
ter understand the impact of Medicaid managed care. This paper
focuses on a speciﬁc group of enrollees (children) and broad meas-
ures of utilization (inpatient, outpatient, and professional) within
one state (Kentucky), which raises potential concerns regarding
external validity.35 We  can address this to some degree in future
work by using our identiﬁcation strategy to do an analysis of the
impact managed care on adult Medicaid enrollees in Kentucky or
focus on more speciﬁc types of services, such as prescription drugs.
In particular, we  would not want to extrapolate our current ﬁndings
with respect to the health outcomes for asthmatic children to other
35 Of course, focusing on children is not that restrictive because over half of Med-
icaid recipients are children. For more information, see: http://www.medicaid.gov/
Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Population/By-population.html.
types of Medicaid recipients, such as pregnant women or those
dually eligible for Medicare, or other types of vulnerable children,
such as newborns.
Even if we answered every possible question about Medicaid
managed care in the Kentucky context, it is not necessarily clear
how well these ﬁndings would translate to other states. For exam-
ple, Kentucky ranks 45th out of 50 states in overall health according
to the United Health Foundation, with above average rates of pre-
ventable hospitalizations, obesity, smoking, infant mortality, and
children in poverty, among other measures.36 On the other hand,
as is often the case with research involving state Medicaid pro-
grams, there is a trade-off between the number of states included
in the analysis and the ability to fully understand the details of the
reforms of interest in order to develop a strong research design that
allows for causal inference. This suggests the need for more work
on Medicaid-related topics to come from other states. State Med-
icaid expansions under the ACA will no doubt be a catalyst for such
work in the future.
Despite these limitations, our results should be of inter-
est to policymakers considering Medicaid managed care as a
cost-containment measure, given the speciﬁc ﬁscal challenge of
Medicaid expansion under the Affordable Care Act (ACA). Such
ﬁnancial difﬁculties have recently led to further transition toward
Medicaid managed care in Kentucky. In November 2011, Ken-
tucky expanded Medicaid managed care to the 104 non-Passport
counties.37 The expansion is projected to save the program $1.3
billion. In addition, Florida recently approved a massive overhaul
of its Medicaid system, which will shift hundreds of thousands of
Medicaid recipients into HMOs. Plan sponsor, Representative Rob
Schenck (R-Spring Hill, FL), said “We  get to save billions of dollars,
and we  get to deliver better health care.”38 It is anticipated that
Medicaid managed care will be available in all areas of Florida by
October 2014.39 Finally, Governor Sam Brownback announced in
late 2011 a massive restructuring of Kansas Medicaid, called Kan-
Care. KanCare was implemented in January 2013, is projected to
save $853.1 million during its ﬁrst ﬁve years, and would make
Kansas the only state with managed care companies providing care
statewide to all Medicaid enrollees.40 Our analysis suggests that
up front plan design decisions, such as the choice of reimburse-
ment mechanism for physicians, may  in large part determine the
eventual success or failure of any expansions of managed care.
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Table  A1
Services covered by the state capitation payments to the plans.
Capitated services Excluded services
Inpatient hospital services Dental services Mental Hospitals
Outpatient hospital services Medical transportation Psychiatrists
Urgent and emergency services EPSDT services Psychiatric Beds (Inpatient Hospital)
Outpatient surgical services Vision care Non-Emergency Transportation (Mental Health)
Medical services provided by: Preventive Health Services provided by: AIS/MR Services
•  Physicians • Public Health Departments ICF/MR
•  Advanced Practice RNs • FQHCs Targeted Case Management (Behavioral Health)
•  Physician Assistants • Rural Health Centers Home and Community-Based Waiver Services
•  FQHCs Hearing Services (under age 21) Certain Medicare-Only Services:
•  Primary Care Centers Durable Medical Equipment • CORF Services
•  Rural Health Clinics Alternative Birthing Services • Chiropractors
Laboratory Podiatry Services • Physicians Assistant
X-rays Family Planning Clinic Services • Physical and Occupational Therapy
Appropriate Escort Meals and Lodging Renal Dialysis • Psychologist
Therapeutic Evaluation and Treatment: Hospice Services • Clinical Social Worker
•  Physical Therapy Organ Transplant Services Nursing Facility Services
•  Speech Therapy Specialized Case Management for Children and
Adults with Complex Conditions
EPSDT Special Services (Behavioral Health)
•  Occupational Therapy Behavioral Health (Limited to PCP) School-Based Services for Disabled Students
Home Health Services Medical Detoxiﬁcation Early Intervention Services for Infants and Toddlers with Disabilities
Pharmacy and Limited OTC Drugs
Source: Bartosch and Haber (2004).
Table A2
First stage regression results of monthly HMO  enrollment on HMO eligibility.
Passport program KHS program
Child is Eligible For Managed Care (Based On Initial County of Residence and Time Period) 0.690***(0.002) 0.789*** (0.001)
30  Month–Year Dummies? Yes Yes
Child  Fixed Effects? Yes Yes
R2 0.69 0.75
#  children 4706 13,590
#  child – months 141,180 407,700
Source: De-identiﬁed, linked Medicaid claims and enrollment data provided by the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services.
Notes: These regressions also include monthly controls for child age. Standard errors are given in parenthesis.
*  Statistically signiﬁcant difference at 10% level.
**  Statistically signiﬁcant difference at 5% level.
*** Statistically signiﬁcant difference at 1% level.
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